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Summary
In July 2003, computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice Universities
released a security analysis of software purportedly from a direct recording electronic
(DRE) touchscreen voting machine of a major voting-system vendor.  The study drew
public attention to a long-simmering controversy about whether current DREs are
vulnerable to tampering that could influence the outcome of an election. 
Many innovations that have become familiar features of modern elections, such
as the secret ballot and mechanical lever voting machines, originated at least in part
as a way to reduce election fraud and abuse.  Computer-assisted counting of ballots,
first used in the 1960s, can be done very rapidly and makes some kinds of tampering
more difficult.  However, it does not eliminate the potential for fraud, and it has
created new possibilities for tampering through manipulation of the counting
software and hardware.  DREs, introduced in the 1970s, are the first voting systems
to be completely computerized. Touchscreen DREs are arguably the most versatile
and user-friendly of any current voting system.  Their use is expected to increase
substantially under provisions of The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L.
107-252), especially the requirement that, beginning in 2006, each polling place used
in a federal election have at least one voting machine that is fully accessible for
persons with disabilities. 
With DREs, unlike document-ballot systems, the voter sees only a
representation of the ballot; votes are registered electronically.  Some computer
security experts believe that this and other features of DREs make them more
vulnerable to tampering than other kinds of voting systems, especially through the
use of malicious computer code.  While there are some differences of opinion among
experts about the extent and seriousness of those security concerns, there appears to
be an emerging consensus that in general, current DREs do not adhere sufficiently
to currently accepted security principles for computer systems, especially given the
central importance of voting systems to the functioning of democratic government.
Others caution, however, that there are no demonstrated cases of computer tampering
in public elections, and any major changes that might be made to improve security
could have unanticipated negative effects of their own.  Several proposals have been
made to improve the security of DREs and other computer-assisted voting systems.
They include (1) ensuring that accepted security protocols are followed appropriately,
(2) improving security standards and certification of voting systems, (3) use of open-
source computer code, and (4) improvements in verifiability and transparency. 
Much of the current debate has focused on which such proposals should be
implemented and through what means — in particular, whether federal involvement
is necessary. Some states are already addressing these issues.  The Election
Assistance Commission established by HAVA will have some responsibilities
relating to voting system security and could address this controversy directly.  Some
observers have also proposed federal funding for research and development in this
area, while others have proposed legislative solutions including enhancement of the
audit requirements under HAVA.  
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Election Reform and Electronic Voting
Systems (DREs): Analysis of Security
Issues
In July 2003, computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice Universities
released a security analysis of software purportedly from an electronic voting
machine (commonly called direct recording electronic, or DRE, systems) of a major
voting-system vendor.1  The Hopkins study drew public attention to a long-
simmering controversy about whether current DREs are vulnerable to tampering that
could influence the outcome of an election.  A significant factor contributing to this
increased attention is the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L. 107-252),
which substantially increases the federal role in election administration, including
federal funding of and requirements for voting systems.  Although HAVA retains the
predominant role that state and local jurisdictions have traditionally had in the
administration of elections, the Act’s requirements are expected to result in increased
use of DREs, and some observers have therefore called for congressional action to
address the DRE controversy.  To understand this controversy requires an
examination of several questions about voting-system security:
! Do DREs exhibit genuine security vulnerabilities?  If so, could those
vulnerabilities be exploited to influence an election?
! To what extent do current election administration procedures and
other security measures protect against threats to and vulnerabilities
of DRE systems?
! Do those threats and vulnerabilities apply to computer-assisted
voting systems other than DREs?
! What are the options for addressing any threats and vulnerabilities
that do exist, and what are the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the different options?
To address those questions, this report begins with a description of the historical
and policy context of the controversy.  That is followed by an analysis of the issues
in the broader context of computer security.  The next section discusses several
proposals that have been made for addressing those issues, and the last section
discusses options for action that might be considered by policymakers.  The report
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2  In 2000, Internet voting was offered in pilot projects during primaries in Arizona and
Alaska.  A small pilot program for military and overseas voters was run for the general
election by the Federal Voting Assistance Project (FVAP) under the Department of Defense.
FVAP is expected to repeat the effort for the 2004 federal election.  While the program used
the Internet to transmit ballots to local jurisdictions in a secure fashion, the ballots were then
printed and counted in the same way as other absentee ballots.  See Kevin Coleman, Internet
Voting, CRS Report RS20639, 23 September 2003.  
3  To choose a different candidate than the one printed on the ballot required crossing out
the candidate’s name and writing in another.  Some party operatives developed ballots that
made it difficult to perform write-ins — for example, by printing the names in very small
type and cramming them together on a narrow strip of paper (See Richard Reinhardt,
“Tapeworm Tickets and Shoulder Strikers,” American West 3 (1966): 34-41, 85-88).
4  S.J. Ackerman, “The Vote that Failed,” Smithsonian Magazine, November 1998, 36,38.
does not discuss Internet voting, which is not likely to be used in the near future for
federal elections in other than minor ways, largely because of security concerns.2  
The administration of elections is a complex task, and there are many factors
involved in choosing and using a voting system in addition to security.  They include
factors such as reliability, propensity for voter error, usability, and cost.  This report
does not discuss those factors, but election administrators must consider them in
decisions about what systems to use and how to implement them.  Also, security is
an issue for other aspects of election administration, such as voter registration, which
are beyond the scope of this report.  
Background and History of the Issue
Many innovations that have become familiar features of modern elections
originated at least in part as a way to reduce election fraud such as tampering with
ballots to change the vote count for a candidate or party.  For example, in much of
nineteenth century America, a voter typically would pick up a paper ballot preprinted
with the names of candidates for one party and simply drop the form into the ballot
box.  There was no need to actively choose individual candidates.3  This ticket or
prox ballot was subject to fraud in at least two ways.  First, the number and sequence
of ballots printed was not controlled, so it could be difficult to determine if a ballot
box had been stuffed with extra ballots or if ballots had been substituted after votes
were cast.  Second, an observer could determine which party a voter had chosen by
watching what ballot the voter picked up and deposited in the ballot box — votes
could therefore be bought or coerced with comparative ease.  
Australian Secret Ballot.  After a series of scandals involving vote-buying
in the 1880s, calls for reform led to widespread adoption of the Australian or mark-
choice ballot.4  Such ballots list the names of all candidates, and the voter marks the
ballot to choose among them.  The ballots are commonly printed with unique,
consecutive serial numbers, facilitating ballot control and thereby helping to prevent
ballot stuffing and substitution.  All printed ballots are otherwise identical, and voters
typically fill them out in the privacy of a voting booth.  This ballot secrecy makes it
difficult for anyone else to know with certainty what choices a voter has made.
While providing improved security, the Australian secret ballot did not eliminate
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5  Some observers have expressed concern that use of absentee ballots and other kinds of
remote voting, such as via the Internet, compromise ballot secrecy and therefore increase
the risk of vote buying and coercion.  They are concerned about the impacts that the growing
use of absentee voting in the United States might have on election fraud and abuse.  Others,
in contrast, believe that the risks are small and greatly outweighed by the benefits.  For a
general discussion of the benefits and disadvantages of different kinds of voting systems,
see Eric Fischer, Voting Technologies in the United States: Overview and Issues for
Congress, CRS Report RL30773, 21 March 2001.  
tampering.  Ballots could still be removed, spoiled, or altered by corrupt pollworkers,
or even substituted or stuffed, although with greater difficulty than with prox ballots.
It also did not eliminate the possibility of vote-buying or coercion, but it made them
more difficult.5
Mechanical Lever Machine.  One way to eliminate some means of ballot
tampering is to eliminate document ballots.  That became possible with the
introduction of the lever voting machine in 1892.  With this system, a voter enters the
voting booth and sees a posted ballot with a small lever near the name of each
candidate or other ballot choice.  The voter chooses a candidate by moving the
appropriate lever.  Mechanical interlocks prevent voters from choosing more
candidates than permitted for an office (such as two candidates for President).  After
completing all choices, the voter pulls a large lever to cast the ballot, and the votes
are recorded by advances in mechanical counters in the machine.  The lever machine
therefore eliminates the need to count ballots manually.  Instead, pollworkers read the
numbers recorded by the counters.  Because there is no document ballot, recounts and
audits are limited to review of totals recorded by each machine.  Of course, tampering
is also possible with lever machines.  For example, the mechanisms could be adjusted
so that the counter does not always advance when a particular candidate is chosen.
Computer-Assisted Counting (Punchcard and Optical Scan).
Another major technological advance in voting — the first use of computers to count
votes — came with the introduction of the punchcard system, first used in 1964.  The
optical-scan voting system, which also uses computers for vote-counting, was first
used in the 1980s.  In both kinds of voting system, document ballots are fed into an
electronic reader and the tallies stored in computer memory and media.  Tallying can
be done at either the precinct or a central location.  Computer-assisted counting of
document ballots can be done very rapidly, thus speeding the reporting of election
results.  It is much more efficient for counting large numbers of ballots than manual
tallying.  It makes some kinds of tampering more difficult than with manual counting,
but it does not eliminate them, and it creates possibilities for tampering with the
counting software and hardware.
Electronic Voting Machine.  DREs (direct recording electronic systems) are
the first completely computerized voting systems.  They were introduced in the
1970s.  DREs are somewhat analogous to (although more sophisticated than) lever
machines. The voter chooses candidates from a posted ballot. Depending on the
equipment used, the ballot may be printed and posted on the DRE, as it is with a
lever machine, or it may be displayed on a computer screen. Voters make their
choices by pushing buttons, touching the screen, or using other devices. The voter
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6 Accessibility for blind persons usually involves use of an audio program.  
7  An overvote occurs if a voter chooses more candidates for an office than is permitted —
such as marking two candidates for President of the United States.  An undervote occurs if
a voter chooses fewer candidates than is permitted — most commonly, failing to vote for
any candidate for a particular office.  Virtually all overvotes are thought to be errors,
whereas undervotes are often thought to be intentional, for example if the voter does not
prefer any of the candidates.  However, undervotes can also result from voter error.
8  In 1980, about 1 out of every 40 voters used DREs.  By 2000, about 1 out of every 9 did
(Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is, What Could Be, July 2001,
[http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/index.html] (Caltech/MIT study)).
submits the choices made before leaving the booth, for example by pushing a “vote”
button, and the votes are then recorded electronically. 
There is considerable variability in the design of DREs, but they can be
classified into three basic types.  The oldest design essentially mimics the interface
of a lever machine.  The entire posted ballot is visible at once.  Instead of moving
levers to make choices, the voter pushes a button next to a candidate’s name, or
pushes on the name itself, triggering an underlying electronic microswitch and
turning on a small light next to the choice.  With the second type, a ballot page is
displayed on a computer screen, and the voter uses mechanical devices such as arrow
keys and buttons to make choices on a page and to change ballot pages.  The third
type is similar to the second except that it has a touchscreen display, where the voter
makes a choice by touching the name of the candidate on the computer screen and
casts the ballot by pressing a separate button after all choices have been made.  In all
kinds of DREs, when a ballot is cast, the votes are directly stored in a computer
memory device such as a removable memory card or nonvolatile memory circuit.  As
with lever machines, there is no document ballot, although with a DRE each cast
ballot may also be separately recorded. 
Touchscreen and other DREs using computer-style displays are arguably the
most versatile and user-friendly of any current voting system.  Each machine can
easily be programmed to display ballots in different languages and for different
offices, depending on voters’ needs.  It can also be programmed to display a voter’s
ballot choices on a single page for review before casting the vote.  It can be made
fully accessible for persons with disabilities, including visual impairment.6  Like
lever machines, it can prevent overvotes and ambiguous choices or spoilage of the
ballot from extraneous marks, since there is no document ballot; but it can also notify
voters of undervotes.7  No other kind of voting system possesses all of these features.
DREs and HAVA.  The popularity of DREs, particularly the touchscreen
variety, has grown in recent years,8 and their use is expected to increase substantially
under provisions of HAVA.  Three provisions in the Act are likely to provide such
an impetus.  First, HAVA authorized $3.65 billion over four years for replacing
punchcard and lever machines and for making other election administration
improvements, including meeting the requirements of the Act.  In FY2003, Congress
appropriated $1.48 billion for these purposes (P.L. 108-7), and the Administration
requested $500 million for FY2004.  Second, beginning in 2006, HAVA requires that
voting systems notify voters of overvotes and permit them to review their ballots and
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9  However, jurisdictions using hand-counted paper ballots, punchcards, or central-count
systems can rely instead on voter education and instruction programs.
10  Some kinds of error could be detected when voter registers and vote tallies are reconciled
— for example, if the total number of votes for an office were greater than the total number
of voters at the precinct.  However, resolving such a problem in a way that reflects how
voters actually voted would not be straightforward.  
11   Malware, an elision of malicious software, includes viruses, Trojan horses, worms, logic
bombs, and any other computer code that has or is intended to have harmful effects.  There
are various ways of hiding malware.  A Trojan horse, for example, is malware disguised as
something benign or useful.  See Kenneth Thompson, “Reflections on Trusting Trust,”
Communications of the ACM  27 (1984): 761-763, avai lable  a t
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correct errors before casting their votes.9  Third, the Act requires, also beginning in
2006, that each polling place used in a federal election have at least one voting
machine that is fully accessible for persons with disabilities. DREs are the only
machines at present that can fulfill the accessibility requirement.  They can also
easily meet the requirements for error prevention and correction.  
Security Concerns about DREs.  One thing that distinguishes DREs from
document ballot systems is that with DREs, the voter does not see the actual ballot,
but rather a representation of it on the face of the machine.  With few exceptions,
current DREs do not provide a truly independent record of each individual ballot that
can be used in a recount to check for machine error or tampering.  The ballot itself
consists of redundant electronic records in the machine’s computer memory banks,
which the voter cannot see.  This is analogous to the situation with mechanical lever
voting machines, where casting the ballot moves counters that are out of view of the
voter.  In a lever machine, if the appropriate counters do not move correctly when a
voter casts the ballot, the voter will not know, nor would an observer.  Similarly, with
a DRE, if the machine recorded a result in its memory that was different from what
the voter chose, neither the voter nor an observer would know.10  
The same is true with a computerized counting system when it reads punchcards
or optical scan ballots.  Even if the ballot is tabulated in the precinct and fed into the
reading device in the presence of the voter, neither the voter nor the pollworker
manning the reader can see what it is recording in its memory.  However, with such
a reader, the ballot documents could be counted on another machine or by hand if
there were any question about the results. 
Lever machines also do not have an independent document ballot.  That has led
some observers to distrust those machines, but most who use them appear confident
that tests and other procedural safeguards render them sufficiently safe from
tampering.  Is the same true for DREs?  Some computer experts think not, arguing
that the software could be modified in ways that could alter the results of an election
and that would be very difficult to detect.  This concern appears to stem largely from
three factors:  
! Malicious computer code, or malware, can often be written in such
a way that it is very difficult to detect.11  
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11 (...continued)
[http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95].  He concluded that it can be essentially impossible to
determine whether a piece of software is trustworthy by examining its source code, no
matter how carefully.  The entire system must be evaluated, and even then it can be very
difficult to find malware.  However, use of modern software engineering techniques can
minimize many problems with software design that can make software vulnerable to
malware (see, for example, Richard C. Linger and Carmen J. Trammell, “Cleanroom
Software Engineering Reference Model, Version 1.0,” Technical Report
CMU/SEI-96-TR-022, November 1996, available at [http://www.sei.cmu.edu/pub/
documents/96.reports/pdf/tr022.96.pdf]). See page 12–14 of this report for further
discussion of this issue.
12  See page 13 for further discussion of this issue.
13  See page 26 for further discussion of this issue.
14  See, for example, Ronnie Dugger, “Annals of Democracy (Voting by Computer),” The
New Yorker, 7 November 1988, 40-108; Roy G. Saltman, “Accuracy, Integrity, and Security
in Computerized Vote-Tallying,” NBS Special Publication 500-158, August 1988.
15  See Federal Election Commission, Voting Systems Performance and Test Standards, 30
April 2002, [http://www.fec.gov/pages/vssfinal/vss.html].
16  See NASED, “General Overview for Getting a Voting System Qualified”, 30 September
2003, [http://www.nased.org/ITA_process.htm].  The program is managed by The Election
Center, [http://www.electioncenter.org].  As of September 2003, more than 20 optical scan
and DRE voting systems were listed as certified through this process.
17  It may also be kept by the states (The Election Center, “DREs and the Election Process,”
April 2003, [http://www.electioncenter.org/newstuff/DREs%20and%20the%20Election
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! DRE software is moderately complex, and it is generally accepted
that the more complex a piece of software is, the more difficult it can
be to detect unauthorized modifications.12  
! Most manufacturers of DREs treat their software code as proprietary
information and therefore not available for public scrutiny.
Consequently, it is not possible for experts not associated with the
companies to determine how vulnerable the code is to tampering.13
Voting System Standards and Certification.  Concerns such as those
described above have been voiced by some experts at least since the 1980s.14  The
development of the Voluntary Voting Systems Standards (VSS) by the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) in 1990, and the subsequent adoption of those standards
by many states, helped to reduce those concerns.  The VSS were developed
specifically for computer-assisted punchcard, optical scan, and DRE voting systems.
They include a chapter on security, which was substantially expanded in the updated
version, released in 2002.15  Along with the standards, a voluntary testing and
certification program was developed and administered through the National
Association of State Election Directors (NASED).  In this program, an independent
test authority (ITA) chosen by NASED tests voting systems and certifies those that
comply with the VSS.16  Testing is done of both hardware and software, and the




18  HAVA does not direct the EAC to include any specific issues in the guidelines, although
the guidance must address the specific voting system requirements in the Act, and NIST is
directed to provide technical support with respect to security, protection and prevention of
fraud, and other matters. However, in the debate on the House floor before passage of the
conference agreement on October 10, 2002, a colloquy (Congressional Record, daily ed.,
148: H7842) stipulated an interpretation that the guidelines specifically address the
usability, accuracy, security, accessibility, and integrity of voting systems.
19  Studies that specifically addressed the security of voting systems included the
Caltech/MIT study; The Constitution Project, Forum on Election Reform, Building
Consensus on Election Reform, August 2001, [http://www.constitutionproject.org/eri/
CPReport.pdf]; The National Commission on Federal Election Reform, To Assure Pride and
Confidence in the Electoral Process, August 2001, [http://www.reformelections.org/data/
reports/99_full_report.php]; National Conference of State Legislatures, Elections Reform
Task Force, Voting in America, August 2001, [http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2001/
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questions arise about whether the software used in an election has been tampered
with, that code can be compared to the escrowed version.  Systems that receive
NASED certification may also need to go through state and local certification
processes before being used by an election jurisdiction.  
HAVA creates a new mechanism for the development of voluntary voting
system standards.  It creates the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to replace
the FEC’s Office of Election Administration and establishes three bodies under the
EAC: a 110-member Standards Board consisting of state and local election officials,
a 37-member Board of Advisors representing relevant government agencies and
associations and fields of science and technology, and a 15-member Technical
Guidelines Development Committee chaired by the Director of National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).  This last committee is charged with making
recommendations for voluntary standards (called guidelines in the Act), to be
reviewed by the two boards and the EAC.18  
HAVA also requires the EAC to provide for testing, certification, and
decertification of voting systems and for NIST to be involved in the selection and
monitoring of testing laboratories.  The EAC is also required to perform a study of
issues and challenges — including the potential for fraud — associated with
electronic voting, and periodic studies to promote accurate, secure, and expeditious
voting and tabulation.  HAVA also provides grants for research and development on
security and other aspects of voting systems.  The voting system requirements in the
Act do not specifically mention security but do require that each voting system
produce a permanent paper audit document for use as the official record for any
recount.  This requirement is for the system, not for each ballot.  For example, most
DREs can print a tally of votes recorded and therefore can meet this requirement.
The Caltech/MIT Study.  The problems identified after the November 2000
federal election prompted wide public concern about voting systems and led to




20  Some international observers consider openness and public control to be important
components of any voting system (Lilian Mitrou and others, “Electronic Voting:
Constitutional and Legal Requirements, and Their Technical Implications,” in Secure
Electronic Voting, ed. Dimitris Gritzalis (Boston: Kluwer, 2003), p. 43-60.
21  HAVA calls for appointment of members by February 26, 2003.  On October 3, 2003, the
White House forwarded nominations to the Senate for confirmation.  The nominations were
referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, which held a hearing on the
nominations on October 28.  
22  California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley, “Ad Hoc Touch Screen Task Force Report,”
1 July 2003, [http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/taskforce_report.htm] (California Task Force
report).
23  Bev Harris, “System Integrity Flaw Discovered at Diebold Election Systems,” Scoop, 10
(continued...)
HAVA.  The most extensive examination of security was performed by scientists at
the California Institute of Technology and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Their report identified four main security strengths of the electoral process that has
evolved in the United States: the openness of the election process, which permits
observation of counting and other aspects of election procedure; the decentralization
of elections and the division of labor among different levels of government and
different groups of people; equipment that produces “redundant trusted recordings”
of votes; and the public nature and control of the election process.20  The report
expressed concern that current trends in electronic voting are weakening those
strengths and pose significant risks, but that properly designed and implemented
electronic voting machines can improve, rather than diminish, security. 
The California Task Force Report.  The concerns expressed by the
Caltech/MIT study and others were partially addressed by HAVA, but as states began
to acquire DREs, and the appointment of EAC members was delayed,21 some
observers began expressing concerns that states were purchasing flawed machines
with no federal mechanism in place for addressing the problems.  In response to such
concerns, the California secretary of state established a task force to examine the
security of DREs and to consider improvements.  The report22 recommended changes
to how voting systems are tested at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as other
changes in security for software and for vendor practices.  It also recommended the
implementation of a voter-verified audit trail — that is, a mechanism, whether paper-
based or electronic, that produces an independent record of a voter’s choices that the
voter can verify before casting the ballot and that can be used as a check against
tampering or machine error.  Until such a system can be implemented, the task force
recommended the use of “parallel monitoring,” in which a selection of machines are
tested while in actual use on election day to determine if they are recording votes
accurately.  
The Hopkins Study.  Until recently, the concerns raised about DRE
vulnerabilities were considered by many to be largely hypothetical.  However, in
early 2003, some election-reform activists discovered23 an open website containing
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large numbers of files relating to voting systems of Diebold Election Systems, a
major voting system vendor which had recently won contracts with Georgia and
Maryland to provide touchscreen DREs.  Activists downloaded and posted many of
those files on Internet sites, and the authors of the Hopkins study used some of those
files to analyze computer source code that “appear[ed] to correspond to a version of
Diebold’s voting system.”24  Their analysis concluded that the code had serious
security flaws that could permit tampering by persons at various levels, including
voters, election workers, Internet “hackers,” and even software developers.  Diebold
quickly rebutted those claims,25 arguing that they were based on misunderstanding
of election procedures and of the equipment within which the software was used, and
that the analysis was based on an “inadequate, incomplete sample” of Diebold’s
software.  Some computer scientists, while agreeing that the code contained security
flaws, also criticized the study for not reflecting standard election procedures.26  
Shortly after the Hopkins study was released, Maryland Governor Robert
Ehrlich ordered that the contract with Diebold be suspended pending the outcome of
an independent security analysis.  That analysis,27 while agreeing with several of the
criticisms of the Hopkins study, found that the Diebold system, as implemented in
the state, had serious security flaws.  The report concludes overall that this voting
system, “as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of
compromise” and made many recommendations for improvements.28   The Maryland
State Board of Elections has developed a plan to implement those
recommendations.29  
The extent to which the risks identified in the Maryland study may apply to
other states or to other DREs may be worth examination by state officials.  In Ohio,
which has also been considering the purchase of Diebold DREs, secretary of state
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Kenneth Blackwell has also initiated a security evaluation of electronic voting
devices from four vendors.30 
Analysis of the Problem
Elections are at the heart of the democratic form of government, and providing
sufficient security for them is therefore critical to the proper functioning of a
democracy.  There has been some disagreement among experts about the seriousness
of the potential security problems with DREs and, therefore, what is needed to ensure
sufficient security.  While it is generally accepted that tampering is possible with any
computer system given enough time and resources, some experts believe that current
security practices are adequate.  Others believe that substantial additional steps are
needed.  To determine the nature and extent of the problem and what solutions might
be considered requires an understanding of some general concepts in computer
security, which are discussed in this section, along with their applicability to
computer-assisted voting systems.  The discussion is organized along four themes:
threats, vulnerabilities, defense, and response and recovery after an incident occurs.
The term threat can be used in several different ways, but in this report it refers
to a possible attack — what could happen.  Descriptions of threats often include both
the nature of the possible attack, those who might perpetrate it, and the possible
consequences if the attack is successful.  Vulnerability usually refers to a weakness
that an attack might exploit — how an attack could be accomplished.  Analysis of
threats and vulnerabilities, when combined, can lead to an assessment of risk.
Statements of risk often combine both the probability of a successful attack and some
measure of its likely consequences.31  Defense refers to how a system is protected
from attack.  Response and recovery refer to how, and how well, damage is mitigated
and repaired and information and functionality are recovered in the event of a
successful attack.  
Threats
Kinds of Attacks and Attackers.  The best known type of attack on a
voting system is one that changes the vote totals from what voters actually cast.
Historically, such tampering has been performed by corrupt officials or partisans, one
of the most famous examples being Tammany Hall in New York City, of which Boss
Tweed said, “the ballots made no result; the counters made the result.”32  Sometimes,
others who stood to benefit from a particular outcome would be involved, as was
reportedly the case with respect to allegations of vote-buying in Indiana with money
CRS-11
33  S.J. Ackerman, “The Vote that Failed.”
34  A common prayer of election officials on election day is said to be “Please may it not be
close!”
35  This could potentially be done, for example, if voting or counting machines in precincts
used modem connections for transmittal of tallies to the central election office, and a
tamperer could use that connection before the polls closed to send results to another
location.  
36  Eric Fischer, Coordinator, Understanding Cybersecurity: A CRS Workshop, CRS Online
Video MM70048, 21 July 2003.  
from some of New York’s “robber barons” in the presidential election of 1888.33  The
goal of such tampering would generally be to influence the final vote tally so as to
guarantee a particular result.  That could be accomplished by several means, such as
adding, dropping, or switching votes.  Many of the features of modern voting systems
— such as secret balloting and the use of observers — are designed to thwart such
threats.  
The impact of such vote tampering depends on several factors.  Two of the most
important are the scale of an attack and the competitiveness of the contest.  An attack
would have to have sufficient impact to affect the outcome of the election.  For that
to happen, scale is critical.  If tampering impacts only one ballot or one voting
machine, the chances of that affecting the election outcome would be small.  But
tampering that affects many machines or the results from several precincts could have
a substantial impact, although it might also be more likely to be detected.  The scale
of attack needed to affect the outcome of an election depends on what proportion of
voters favor each candidate.  The more closely contested an election is, the smaller
the degree of tampering that would be necessary to affect the outcome.34 
While attacks that added, subtracted, or changed individual votes are of
particular concern, other kinds of attacks also need to be considered.  One type of
attack might gather information that a candidate could use to increase the chance of
winning.  For example, if vote totals from particular precincts could secretly be made
known to operatives for one candidate before the polls closed,35 the results could be
used to adjust get-out-the-vote efforts, giving that candidate an unfair advantage.
Another type of attack might be used to disrupt voting.  For example, malware could
be used to cause voting machines to malfunction frequently.  The resulting delays
could reduce turnout, perhaps to the benefit of one candidate, or could even cause
voters to lose confidence in the integrity of the election in general.  The latter might
be of more interest to terrorists or others with an interest in having a negative impact
on the political system generally.
An Evolving Threat Environment.  The kinds of attacks described above
are potential threats against any voting system.  However, the growing use of
information technology in elections has had unique impacts on the threat
environment.  It provides the opportunity for new kinds of attacks, from new kinds
of attackers.  As information technology has advanced and cyberspace has grown, so
too have the rate and sophistication of cyberattacks in general:36  
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! The number of reported computer-security violations has grown
exponentially in the past decade, from about 100 in 1989 to more
than 100,000 in the first three quarters of 2003.37  
! Potential threats may now come from many sources — amateur or
professional hackers using the Internet, insiders in organizations,
organized crime, terrorists, or even foreign governments.  With
respect to election tampering, some such attackers could benefit in
traditional ways, but some, such as terrorists, might be interested
instead in disrupting elections or reducing the confidence of voters
in the electoral process. 
! New and more ingenious kinds of malware are constantly being
invented and used.  There are now tens of thousands of known
viruses, and the sophistication of tools used to develop and use new
ones has increased. 
Malware in a voting system could be designed to operate in very subtle ways,
for example, dropping or changing votes in a seemingly random way to make
detection more difficult.  Malware can also be designed to be adaptive — changing
what it does depending on the direction of the tally.  It could also potentially be
inserted at any of a number of different stages in the development and
implementation process — from the precinct all the way back to initial manufacture
— and lie in wait for the appropriate moment.  
Several other kinds of attack could also be attempted in addition to malware.
Among them are electronic interception and theft or modification of information
during transport or transmission, modifications or additions of hardware, and
bypassing system controls or misuse of authority to tamper with or collect
information on software or election data.38 
Vulnerabilities
The threats discussed above, and others, are of course only harmful potentially.
Their mere existence does not in itself imply anything about the likelihood that they
are a significant risk in a genuine election.  To be such a risk, there must be
vulnerabilities in the voting system that can be exploited.  For the purposes of this
report, discussion of vulnerabilities is divided into two categories — technical and
social.  
Technical Vulnerabilities.  This category includes weaknesses stemming
from the computer code itself, connection to other computers, and the degree of
auditing transparency of the system.
Computer Code.  In the recent public debate about the security of DREs,
much of the attention has focused on the computer code.  Two significant potential
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vulnerabilities relate to the use of cryptography in the system and the way the code
is designed.  Cryptography39 is one of the most powerful tools available for protecting
the integrity of data.  Robust cryptographic protocols are well-developed and in
common use, for example in online financial transactions.  Cryptography is important
not only in making it difficult for unauthorized persons to view critical information
(security), but also in making sure that information is not changed or substituted in
the process of being transferred (verification).  This could be a concern for DREs;
both the Hopkins and Maryland studies found weaknesses in the way encryption was
used.  
The design of software can have a significant effect on its vulnerability to
malware.  Both the complexity of the code and the way it is designed can have an
impact.  It is a general principle of computer security that the more complex a piece
of software is, the more vulnerable it is to attack.  That is because more complex
code will have more places that malware can be hidden and more potential
vulnerabilities that could be exploited, and is more difficult to analyze for security
problems.  In fact, attackers often discover and exploit vulnerabilities that were
unknown to the developer, and many experts argue that it is impossible to anticipate
all possible weaknesses and points of attack for complex software.  With DREs, each
machine requires relatively complex software, since it serves as a voter interface,
records the ballot choices, and tallies the votes cast on the machine.40  The first
function requires the most complex software, especially if the machine is to be fully
accessible to all voters.  The code used in optical-scan and punchcard readers can be
simpler, as it performs fewer functions.  
Software code that is not well-designed from a security perspective is more
likely than well-designed code to have points of attack and weaknesses that could be
exploited, as well as places for malware to be hidden.  However, code can be
designed so as to minimize such vulnerabilities, and well-developed procedures have
been established to accomplish this goal.41  These procedures can be applied to both
new and legacy systems.  Good design involves not only the code itself, but also the
process by which it is developed and evaluated.  DRE code has been criticized with
respect to its design,42 although the proprietary nature of the software has precluded
thorough public assessment.  The systems may also use commercial off-the-shelf
software for functions such as the operating system, and that software could also have
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vulnerabilities.  However, the software in the major systems in use today has been
evaluated and certified as meeting VSS requirements, including those for security.43
Connection to Other Computers.  This can be a vulnerability because it
provides potential avenues for attack.  The most well-known attack targets are
computers with direct Internet connections that hackers can exploit.  Concerns about
such attacks have made the adoption of Internet voting in public elections generally
unattractive so far from a security perspective.44  While a measure of protection can
be provided by firewall programs and related technology, the safest approach is to
ensure that the voting system computers, including not just the voting machines
themselves but also computers involved in ballot generation and vote tallying, are not
connected to the Internet or to any other computers that are themselves connected to
the Internet.  This isolation is sometimes called “air-gapping.”  However, an effective
air gap must include sufficient security controls for removable media such as floppy
disks,45 CDs, and the memory cards that are often used to transport data from the
precinct to the central election office.46  
Vendors and election jurisdictions generally state that they do not transmit
election results from precincts via the Internet, but they may transmit them via a
direct modem connection.  However, even this approach can be subject to attack via
the Internet, especially if encryption and verification are not sufficient.  That is
because telephone transmission systems are themselves increasingly connected to the
Internet (as exemplified, for example, by the increasing use of Internet-based
telephony), and computers to which the receiving server may be connected, such as
through a local area network (LAN), may have Internet connections.  In fact,
organizations may be unaware of the extent of such connections.47  This can be even
more of an issue if the system uses wireless connectivity.  
The way that a voter interacts with the DRE may provide another possible
source of connection.  For example, with the Diebold DRE, a “smartcard”48 is
inserted into the voting machine to start the voting process (some machines use other
methods, such as a numerical code).  The Hopkins study claims that voters or
pollworkers could program their own smartcards and use them to vote repeatedly or
to manipulate the voting machine. The Diebold rebuttal rejected this assertion. The
Maryland study, while not ruling out this vulnerability, states that software and
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physical controls, and the openness of the voting booth,49 minimize the likelihood of
exploitation.  
Auditing Transparency.  In current DREs, the actions that occur between
ballot screen and the final vote tally are not subject to human observation.  The voter
sees a visual representation of the ballot on the computer screen or face of the DRE.
When the voter pushes the button to cast the ballot, the machine records the votes
electronically.  That means that a voter cannot know if the machine recorded the
choices the voter saw on the screen or some other choices, and an observer also
cannot check to see if all ballots cast are counted correctly.  The former vulnerability
also exists with a mechanical lever machine, and the latter with an optical scan or
punchcard ballot reader, but with a reader, there is a document ballot that can be
checked independently.  While DREs are generally designed to make a separate
recording of each ballot cast,50 this is not an independent record but rather a copy in
a different format of the information sent to the tallying registers. 
Social Vulnerabilities.  A significant and increasingly sophisticated kind of
attack — dubbed “social engineering” by hackers — involves finding and exploiting
weaknesses in how people interact with computer systems.51  Such social
vulnerabilities can include weaknesses relating to policy, procedures, and personnel.
Of the 14 specific risks identified in the Maryland study, most were of these types.52
Policy.  A security policy lays out the overall goals and requirements for a
system and how it is implemented, including the technology itself, procedures, and
personnel.53  An absent or weak policy, or even a good one, if it is not implemented,
is considered a substantial vulnerability.  Security policies of election administrators,
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vendors, third-party suppliers, and the ITAs are all relevant.  The Maryland study
found that the Diebold system as implemented did not comply with the state’s
information security policy and standards.  The study did not examine the security
policies of Diebold or other relevant entities.
Procedure.  The security policy provides the basis from which procedures
such as access controls are developed.  Election administration is a complex effort
involving vendors, ITAs, state and local government, and pollworkers who are often
volunteers, as well as voters.  Also, DREs are potentially targets of attack at virtually
any point from when they are initially developed and manufactured to when they are
used in the polling place.  Consequently, security procedures are especially
important.  Vulnerabilities can occur, for example, if the controls that the
manufacturer uses to prevent insertion of malware are inadequate; if the analyses
performed by evaluators is not sufficient to detect security problems with the
technology; if the chain of custody for software, including updates — from when it
is certified to when it is used in an election — is weak or poorly documented; or if
auditing controls are insufficient.  As with security policy, absent or poor procedures,
or even good ones if they are not properly implemented, can create serious
vulnerabilities.  The Maryland study did not examine vendor or ITA practices54 but
did raise several concerns with respect to the procedures used by the state.  
Personnel.  Perhaps the most important single factor in determining the
vulnerability of a system is the people involved.  It is they who must implement
security policies and procedures and defend against any attacks.  If they are not
adequately skilled and trained, they may be unable to prevent, detect, and react to
security breaches, and they may themselves be more vulnerable to a “social
engineering” attack.  In addition, it can be particularly difficult to defend against
attack by an insider, so background checks and other controls to minimize that risk
are especially important.  The Maryland study pointed out that the state training
program for the Diebold system did not include a security component.
Defense 
Goals of Defense.  It can be useful to think of three goals of defense from an
attack on a computer-based system:  protection, detection, and reaction.55  Protection
involves making a target difficult or unattractive to attack.  For example, good
physical security can prevent attackers from accessing voting machines in a
warehouse.  Use of encryption and authentication technologies can help prevent
attackers from viewing, altering, or substituting election data when it is transferred.
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Currently, election jurisdictions and vendors appear to rely heavily on
procedural mechanisms for protection.56  These may include access controls,
certification procedures, pre-election equipment-testing, and so forth.  Such
procedures are an essential element of an effective defense, although some observers
dispute that they are sufficient to prevent tampering.  Even if they are, they must be
implemented and followed properly if they are to ensure adequate protection.
However, in some circumstances, the time and resources needed to follow such
procedures may conflict with other important goals, such as the timely administration
of an election, forcing election officials to choose whether to risk bypassing or
modifying security procedures.57  
Detection involves identifying that an attack is being or was attempted.  For
example, election observers can serve as detectors of a potential attack.  One of the
criticisms of DREs has been that it is a “black box” system, and observers cannot
detect suspicious activity within the machine.58  One approach to addressing this
issue is the use of auditing.  That can include engineering the DRE so that it creates
a log of all actions performed, especially those that might indicate tampering.  It can
also include the creation of an audit trail for votes.  HAVA requires such a trail for
the voting system, but some observers have proposed the use of voter-verified ballots
for auditing (discussed below59).  Cryptographic protocols may also be useful in
detecting attempts at tampering.60  However, any specific mechanisms that might be
built into the technology itself are proprietary and therefore not discussed in this
report. 
Reaction involves responding to a detected attack in a timely and decisive
manner so as to prevent its success or mitigate its effects.  For example, if an
observer sees something suspicious during voting or tallying, the process can be
stopped and the situation investigated.  Also, a voting machine may be programmed
to shut down if certain kinds of problems are encountered.  The system might have
additional defense measures such as antivirus software.  
To be most effective, the countermeasure must be implemented before the
attacker can do significant damage.  Effective reaction therefore requires early
detection of an attack.  Given the lack of transparency of DRE operations, heavy
reliance may need to be placed on technological countermeasures.  
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Elements of Defense.  It is generally accepted that defense should involve
a focus on three elements:  personnel, technology, and operations.61  The personnel
component focuses on a clear commitment to security by an organization’s
leadership, assignment of appropriate roles and responsibilities, implementation of
physical and personnel security measures to control and monitor access, training that
is appropriate for the level of access and responsibility, and accountability.  The
technology component focuses on the development, acquisition,  and implementation
of hardware and software.  The operations component focuses on policies and
procedures, including such processes as certification, access controls, management,
and assessments.  
A focus that is not properly balanced among those elements creates
vulnerabilities.  Computer security experts have criticized computer-assisted voting
in part because they believe that the security focus has emphasized procedural
safeguards too heavily.  The use of older, “legacy” hardware and software
technology, and weak technology defenses, as well as lack of training of election
personnel in security, are among the concerns experts have cited.  The validity of
such concerns has been disputed by others.62 
For applications where security considerations are a priority, techniques have
been developed to engineer systems to the appropriate level of security corresponding
to the specific needs for the application.  Such systems are designed with carefully
specified requirements and are thoroughly reviewed and tested before
implementation.63  Some experts have proposed that such an approach be used in the
development of voting systems.64
Another general principal is that an effective defense cannot be focused only on
one particular location but needs to operate at all relevant points in the entire
enterprise.65  For voting systems, these points would likely include development
(both software and hardware) by the manufacturer, the certification process,
acquisition of the voting system (including software and hardware updates) by the
state, state and local implementation, and use during elections.  Because of the
proprietary nature of vendor practices, the defenses used by them could not be
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determined for this report.66  State procedures are more transparent in many cases but
vary from state to state.67  
Finally, an effective defense is based on the assumption that attackers will
continuously attempt to breach the defenses (including devising new ways to attack)
and that they will eventually find a vulnerability to exploit.  Therefore, a successful
defense should be robust, so that security needs are met even if an attack occurs.68
One way to accomplish this is through a layered defense, in which more than one
defense mechanism is placed between the attacker and the target.69  If the outer layer
is breached, the next comes into play.  Each layer should include both protection and
detection capability.  For example, a state will use a combination of physical security
(e.g., lock and key), procedural controls (e.g., who is given access to the system and
for what purpose) and auditing (a record of what was done and by whom) to defend
against tampering with voting systems.  Georgia does additional validation testing
on software installed on machines in a local election jurisdiction to ensure that it is
the same as the certified software.70 Other states may have similar procedures.
Trade-Offs.  The combined use of goals and elements as discussed above is
known as defense in depth.  Such a strategy requires balancing “protection capability
and cost, performance, and operational considerations.”71  This balancing can involve
difficult questions, especially with regard to resource allocation.  For example, how
much effort should be expended in threats that may have a significant probability but
a comparatively low impact versus addressing those with very low probability but
very high impact?  The need to weigh such trade-offs occurs throughout the security
arena.  In the area of homeland security, the number of casualties from a terror attack
using the smallpox virus could be much higher than from an attack with explosives,
but the latter is widely considered much more likely.  Furthermore, there are many
other factors that must be weighed, such as balancing protection against the threat,
on the one hand, against the safety of countermeasures (such as vaccines) and
disruption to daily life (such as screening for explosives) on the other. 
Setting priorities with respect to investment in defense in such cases is far from
straightforward. This is true for election administration as well.  Decisions about
what kinds of security to provide and how to provide it must be made in complex
circumstances.  For example, with DREs, the probability of successful tampering
occurring may be very small, but the impact of a successful attack could be very high.
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At the same time, current DREs arguably reduce the risks of certain kinds of
tampering that can occur with paper ballots — such as selectively spoiling certain
ballots during counting.  Many DREs also have other highly desirable features, as
discussed earlier,72 that can substantially reduce the number of votes lost because of
voter error or other problems.  According to one study, over a million of such “lost
votes” could have been prevented during the November 2000 presidential election
if better-designed voting technology had been used.73  
Also, security measures may have unanticipated impacts.  Measures that made
voting much more difficult or complicated and thereby discouraged voters from
participating or increased the rate of voter or pollworker error would probably not be
worth implementing.  Furthermore, voting machines are only part of the election
administration system, and security must be integral to the whole system to be
effective.
Response and Recovery
The idea that no defense is perfect and that attackers try to find the
imperfections means that defenders need to assume that an attack will at some point
be successful.  Some damage will occur before the attack is detected and stopped
(assuming that the attack is detected — in the case of vote tampering, an attacker
would usually prefer that the attack not be discovered and will make efforts to hide
it74).  For this reason, mechanisms for minimizing and recovering from damage that
occurs are considered desirable.  They are also desirable in the event of damage that
can result from sources other than an attack, such as power outages, malfunctioning
voting machines, or administrative problems.  For example, DREs store vote data in
redundant memory locations, in the event that one memory fails.  As the difficulties
with spoiled ballots from the November 2000 Presidential election indicated,75
recovery from some kinds of damage may not be possible, and reliance must be
placed on strengthening preventive measures.  Thus, HAVA requires that voters be
notified of overvotes before a ballot is cast and be given the opportunity to correct
errors.76  
 One criticism of DREs has been that if a problem is discovered during auditing,
it is not clear what can be done to identify which votes were valid and which were
not.  For example, if a machine is suspected of harboring malware, should all votes
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from it be discarded, or would some be counted?  How election officials answer such
questions will depend on state law, regulations, and practices. 
One mechanism for recovery from some kinds of problems is the recount, in
which ballots are counted a second time to address concerns about the accuracy of
the original count.  DREs, like lever machines, simplify recounts and reduce chances
for error in them because the recounts are based on the vote tallies from the
machines, rather than individual ballots.  However, problems with the machines
themselves, including tampering, would probably not be discovered through a
recount.
Confidence in DREs
There appears to be an emerging consensus among computer scientists that
current DREs, and to a lesser extent other computer-assisted voting systems, do not
adhere sufficiently to currently accepted security principles for computer systems,
especially given the central importance of voting systems to the functioning of
democratic government.77  However, election administrators and those with related
expertise tend to express more confidence in the systems as they are currently
realized.78  Also, the fact that security concerns exist does not in itself mean that
voting systems have been compromised or are likely to be.  It does, however, suggest
that the issues raised need to be addressed expeditiously, especially given the
evolving threat environment and vulnerabilities discussed above.
The question of confidence in computer-assisted voting systems is important in
general, since voters must have confidence in the integrity of the voting systems they
use if they are to trust the outcomes of elections and the legitimacy of governments
formed as a result of them.  If the concerns that have been raised about DRE security
become widespread, that confidence could be eroded, whether or not those concerns
are well-founded.  This potential problem could be exacerbated by two factors.  One
is the likelihood, especially given the applicable provisions of HAVA, that the use
of DREs will increase.  The other is the likelihood of increasing concentration of
market share for voting systems in a few companies.79  Historically, election
jurisdictions in the United States have used a wide diversity of voting systems
provided by a broad array of vendors.  This diversity has been considered an
advantage by many, not only in meeting the diverse needs of election jurisdictions,
but also for security, especially in statewide and federal elections where more
systems may be used.  Some experts believe that it is much more difficult to
successfully commit widespread tampering with elections if many different systems
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need to be compromised than if only a few must be.  In any case, as the usage of
DREs increases, they and the companies that make and sell them may be subjected
to increased public scrutiny.  
For these and other reasons, many experts and observers have proposed actions
to resolve the controversy over DRE security.  Several of these ideas are discussed
below.
Proposals for Resolving the Issue
Use Current Procedures
Some observers have argued that existing security mechanisms are sufficient to
resolve any problems and that no new solutions are necessary, although current
procedures may need to be improved, as recommended by the Maryland study.80
These observers argue that the federal Voting System Standards (VSS); NASED,
state, and local certification processes; and vendor and election administration
procedures and controls, when properly implemented, provide sufficient security to
prevent tampering.  They also point to the lack of any proven case, despite many
accusations, of election fraud involving computer tampering,81 and that criminal
penalties provide a deterrent to election fraud.82 Critics state, in contrast, that those
processes and procedures are flawed, and that recommended or stated security
procedures are not always followed.  They also point out that the absence of a proven
case of tampering does not necessarily mean that it has not been attempted, and that
as the usage of DREs increases, the potential payoff for tampering, and hence the
potential threat, will also increase.83
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Improve Security Standards and Certification of Voting
Systems
Some critics have stated that the security provisions in the VSS are
insufficient,84 and that their development did not follow best practices in this area,
as promulgated and practiced, for example, by national and international standards-
setting organizations such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and NIST, which has been
involved only marginally in the development and implementation of the VSS.85  The
VSS have also been criticized for placing too many constraints on the development
of new technology that can address security concerns.86  Critics also point out that
several of the problems identified by the Hopkins and Maryland studies occurred
despite the certification by NASED that the Diebold system conforms to the VSS. 
HAVA requires changes in the processes for developing standards for and
certifying voting systems.  It establishes a Technical Guidelines Development
Committee under the new Election Assistance Commission to assist the EAC in the
development of voluntary voting system guidelines.  These guidelines will essentially
replace the current Voluntary Voting System Standards (VSS), but the Act also
stipulates that the initial set of guidelines will be the most recently adopted version
of the VSS. The new Committee established by HAVA will be chaired by the
Director of NIST and will include, among others, representatives of ANSI, the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and NASED.  IEEE has
already begun developing new draft voting system standards.87  These standards
would presumably be used to help inform the guideline-development process once
the EAC and its support bodies are established.  
The importance of standards was reinforced with the initial adoption and
implementation of the VSS, which led to significant improvements in computer-
assisted voting systems.  Standards are essential to security because they specify
measurable attributes a system needs to be considered trustworthy, and they can
reduce design flaws.88  However, a particular challenge that arises with respect to
security standards is that it is not possible to anticipate all the ways a system might
be attacked.  In addition, standards can provide adversaries with information they can
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use in searching for vulnerabilities.89  Therefore, security standards need to be
continually reevaluated as new threats and vulnerabilities are discovered.  Also, it is
considered risky to treat adherence to standards as an indication that a system is
secure.90  The federal government requires that federal agencies adhere to a set of
computer-security policies, standards, and practices,91 but these do not apply to
voting systems, which are under the purview of state and local governments.  
Standards can be difficult and time-consuming to develop, especially under the
commonly used consensus approach, in which stakeholders reach agreement on
provisions to be included.  Strengths of this approach, when properly implemented,
are that the resulting standards are less likely to contain substantial omissions, and
they are more likely to be acceptable to users and other stakeholders.  Efforts to
develop the VSS began in the 1970s, but the standards were not approved until
1990.92  The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(ISO/IEC 15408), which is a set of requirements for evaluating the security of
information technology, took five years to develop, efforts having been begun in
1993 and completed in 1998.93  The IEEE voting standards project began in 2001 and
has proceeded amid some controversy, which apparently is not atypical for standards
panels addressing difficult issues.94  Given those considerations and the delays in
establishing the EAC, it is not clear whether new standards or guidelines will be in
place before the HAVA voting system requirements go into effect in January 2006;
however, HAVA requires the Technical Guidelines Development Committee to
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submit its initial recommendations to the EAC within nine months of the
Committee’s appointment.95  In any case, even after new standards are approved,
there remain issues relating to testing and certification.  For example, should all
voting systems be required to adhere to the new guidelines or should those certified
under the VSS continue to be accepted?  
The current process for testing and certification of voting systems was initiated
by NASED in 1994.  HAVA directs the EAC to provide for “testing, certification,
decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software by
accredited laboratories” (Sec. 231(a)(1)).  It gives NIST responsibility for
recommending and reviewing testing laboratories.  
While HAVA maintains the voluntary nature of adherence by states to federal
voting system standards and use of certified systems, most states have adopted the
VSS.96  Consequently, if the EAC decertifies voting systems that do not meet the new
guidelines, many states would likely replace those systems, provided that funding
were available to do so.  However, the more stringent a set of standards is with
respect to security, the more time-consuming and expensive it may be to test and
certify the system (some have criticized the Common Criteria for this reason,
although others have suggested that they be applied to voting systems97).  More
secure systems may also be more expensive to manufacture.  Consequently, there
may be economic disincentives for investment in highly secure voting systems,
although such disincentives would likely become less important if public concern
grows.  
Under the current VSS, testing is performed under specific laboratory test
conditions.  Such tests are necessary to determine if the system meets the standards,
but some experts have proposed that they are not sufficient, that additional testing
needs to be done under realistic conditions of use, involving actual voters, and that
systems should be retested after use in the field.98  
Even if new guidelines and certification procedures can be developed that
include state-of-the-art security features, some observers believe that this will not be
sufficient.  They point to three problems:  (1) Given the time required to develop and
implement new voting system guidelines and to test and certify systems under them,
systems reflecting such guidelines will not be in place for several years, whereas the
threat from cyberattacks is present and growing.  (2) Overreliance on any one line of
defense, such as security standards, runs counter to the recommended use of defense
in depth.  (3) The use of standards does nothing about the reduced observability and
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transparency that characterizes computerized voting systems99 in contrast to more
traditional systems, and therefore cannot sufficiently address concerns about public
confidence in the integrity of computer-assisted voting.  Some experts also believe
that certification and procedural controls, including auditing, can never guarantee
security of a voting system.100  This problem, they say, is further complicated by the
need for ballot secrecy, which is not an issue, for example, in computerized financial
transactions.
Use Open Source Software
Some experts have proposed the use of open source software code for at least
some voting system software.101  Such code would be available for public inspection
and undergo thorough security review, and these experts argue that it would therefore
be more secure because the open source review process would be more thorough and
identify more potential security flaws than is possible with proprietary code.
Advocates of proprietary or closed source code argue, in contrast, that this approach
makes potential flaws more difficult to discover and therefore to exploit.  Even if
open source code is superior with respect to security (which remains unproven),
DREs often use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software (such as Microsoft
Windows) that is proprietary.102  
Currently, the code for virtually all voting system software in the United States
is closely held by the vendors, who release it only to select parties, such as the ITAs,
under nondisclosure agreements.  The vendors argue that the use of proprietary
software is important both to protect their intellectual property rights and for security.
While secrecy can be an important security tool (sometimes called “security through
obscurity”), it has some weaknesses.  First, it is fragile, in that once this defense is
breached, the damage cannot be repaired — the code cannot be made secret again.
Second, use of secrecy limits the number of people who can examine the code,
thereby limiting the scrutiny it can receive for vulnerabilities.  Both of these potential
weaknesses were demonstrated by the circumstances leading to the Hopkins study.
Diebold code was posted (perhaps inadvertently) on an open Internet server; the
authors analyzed this code and claimed to have discovered several vulnerabilities
(which Diebold disputed).  
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Some have proposed resolving this issue by using a modular approach that
separates the voter interface or ballot choice function (equivalent to marking an
optical-scan ballot) from the vote-casting function (putting the ballot in the optical-
scan reader).103  The software for the latter would be open source and standardized
and for the former proprietary and more flexible.  The reasons are that vote casting
is a straightforward, well-defined process that requires high security to ensure that
the voter’s actual choices are recorded and counted, whereas the voter interface is
where innovations can provide the greatest advances in usability and other benefits
for voters, and the security requirements are not as stringent.  The code used for vote
casting and counting can be much simpler than that needed for the voter interface,
making security potentially much easier to achieve than is currently the case with
DREs, where both functions are housed within a single unit.
Improve Verifiability and Transparency
Verifiability in elections can be thought of as consisting of two components.
One involves the capability of the voter to verify that his or her ballot was cast as
intended.  This is what is usually meant by voter verifiability.  The other involves the
capability to determine that the final tally accurately reflects all votes as cast by the
voters and that it includes no additional votes — in other words, that no votes were
improperly changed, omitted, or added.  This has been called results verifiability.104
If all voters can obtain both voter and results verifiability, that is known as universal
verifiability.105  Roll-call voting provides robust universal verifiability — voters
publicly record their votes, which are counted in the presence of all voters.  However,
this approach sacrifices ballot secrecy and can be used only for very small electorates.
While ballot secrecy reduces the risk of vote selling and coercion, it complicates
verifiability, since voters cannot know directly if their ballots were counted as cast.
Hand-counted paper ballot systems, which can provide ballot secrecy, may provide
universal verifiability only under some very limited circumstances and only for very
small electorates.  Such systems can provide a kind of surrogate results verifiability,
if observers closely watch the counting of ballots, but even that can be difficult to
achieve.  Lever machines and computer-assisted voting systems arguably exhibit
neither voter nor results verifiability, although document-based systems such as
optical scan and punchcards do retain the capacity for surrogate results verifiability
if manual recounts are done in the presence of observers.  
Some observers believe that the potential security problems associated with the
lack of transparency and observability in vote casting and counting with DREs cannot
be resolved through the use of security procedures, standards, certification, and
testing.  They assert that the only reliable approach is to use ballots that voters can
CRS-28
106  This could be done by the voter or by the DRE (the voter need not handle the ballot but
could view it through a transparent pane (see Rebecca Mercuri, “A Better Ballot Box?”
IEEE Spectrum Online, October 2002, [http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/
publicfeature/oct02/evot.html]), although the latter approach could raise issues about ballot
secrecy if the ballots were deposited in the box in the order in which voters used the DRE
(ballots are not recorded in the order cast in the DRE’s memory).  The method as usually
described does not provide voters with ballot “receipts” that they can take from the polling
place, which would create significant opportunities for fraud and abuse, if those receipts
showed the choices the voter made.
verify independently of the DRE and that these ballots become the official record for
any recounts.  Others assert that voter verifiability is a highly desirable feature but
caution about some of the proposed ways of achieving it.  Still others believe that
there are problems with the approach that make it undesirable.  
HAVA requires that each voting system produce a paper audit record for the
system and that this be the official record for recounts.  It also requires that voters
have the opportunity to correct their ballots before that record is produced.  However,
it does not stipulate that that record consist of individual ballots or that it be
verifiable by the voter. 
At least four different ways of achieving voter verifiability have been proposed.
These are discussed below to illustrate the range of complexity and issues involved.
Voter-Verifiable Paper Ballot.  In the most widely discussed method, the
DRE would print a paper ballot with the voter’s choices listed.  The voter could then
verify that the ballot accurately reflected the voter’s choices as made on the DRE.
Any discrepancies could then be called to the attention of a pollworker.  Once the
voter was satisfied with the paper ballot, it would be deposited in a ballot box106 and
kept in the event of a recount.  A sample of these ballots could also be counted as
part of a standard audit for comparison with the total count.  Some observers also
believe that any recount using these paper ballots should be performed by hand rather
than machine.  
This approach has the following potential advantages:  (1) Any recount would
be based on an independent record that the voter had had an opportunity to verify.
(2) Each election could be audited, and any significant discrepancies between the
electronic and paper tallies would trigger a full recount.  (3) If the recount were
performed by hand, that would take advantage of the transparency and observability
that can be associated with that approach.  (4) The method could help ensure voter
confidence in the legitimacy of election results, since voters would know that ballots
they had verified would be available for recounts.  
The approach has also been criticized, with critics asserting the following:  (1)
It makes voting more complicated and time-consuming by requiring extra steps by
the voter. (2) The use of printers would substantially increase both the cost of
administering an election and the risk of mechanical failure of a voting machine. (3)
It is generally accepted that paper ballot systems cannot be made to conform to the
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HAVA accessibility requirements.107  (4) Since the method is largely untested, it is
not clear to what extent it would improve security in practice and what impacts it
might have on voters.108  (5) Hand counting of the paper ballots would be time-
consuming and arguably more error-prone than machine counting.109  
Votemeter.  There is an electronic version of the above method, in which an
electronic device would be attached to the DRE.  This votemeter would have a
display on which the voter could verify choices and it would record those choices
independently of the DRE.  Those records would be used in any recount and could
also be tallied separately by an independent agency — to provide a check on possible
collusion with respect to the DREs.  Advantages to such a system over a paper trail
would be that it would not have the problems of manual paper recounts, it could
provide a fast, independent, full audit of the DRE vote, and it could be accessible to
blind persons via an audio input.  However, it would still be more complex for the
voter than current systems, and voters would need to trust that the attached unit was
secure.  
Modular Voting Architecture.  A third way to provide voter verifiability
with DREs is analogous to optical scan or punchcard balloting with precinct
counting.110  After a voter makes choices on the voter interface (such as a
touchscreen), the machine writes the ballot to a memory card or other device, called
a frog, which the voter then takes to another machine that reads the ballot.  This
reader would be highly secure, as discussed above.111  It would have a display so that
the voter could verify choices before casting the ballot.  A reader could even be
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provided with an audio program to allow blind voters to verify choices.112  The
advantages and disadvantages of this system are similar to those for the previous two,
depending on its particular design.  
Encrypted Votes.  All three of the above approaches essentially provide a
second, independent audit channel for the voting system.  Another way of providing
verifiability uses cryptographic methods to provide a kind of electronic
verification.113  Proponents argue that a properly designed system using encrypted
votes is conceptually different from the “electronic ballot box” exemplified by DRE
technology and that it provides for privacy, transparency, auditability, and security
in a superior way to any current approach.  This can be part of a more comprehensive
system that uses cryptographic methods throughout the election process — from
election preparation through auditing of the results — that purports essentially to
mimic electronically or even improve upon the observability and transparency
associated historically with manually counted paper ballot systems. 
There are several different possible approaches using cryptographic protocols.114
In one kind of system, the voter, before casting the vote in the voting booth, can see
the ballot choices the encrypted information will correspond to.  When the vote is
cast, a receipt is generated with encrypted information, which could be in any of
several different forms, such as a number or a pattern printed on a piece of paper.115
After the election, each voter can also determine if his or her vote was counted as cast
by comparing the receipt to posted information.116  However, because the information
on the receipt is encrypted, no one, including the voter, can prove what choices were
made.117  The encryption is performed with a set of encryption keys that have been
generated independently by different election trustees — for example, an election
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administrator and representatives of each of the major political parties.  Votes, to be
counted, must be decrypted, which is accomplished by each trustee applying his or
her key, and shuffling the votes before sending them to the next trustee.118
Information related to the encryption is also posted that makes it possible for a trustee
or a member of the public to audit and authenticate the election.119  If a trustee (or
anyone else) attempts to change, omit, or add any ballot, that will be detected in the
audit, because the changes will show up as invalid, just as someone trying to modify
an encrypted financial transaction will be discovered.  At least one proposed system
also permits auditing by observers during the course of the election.  
Proponents of this approach claim that the capabilities of checking the vote
before and after casting the ballot while maintaining ballot secrecy, along with the
high probability of detecting any tampering through public auditing, means that,
unlike with DREs, it is not necessary for voters or election or party officials to trust
the voting machines to produce the correct tallies.  In this sense, the encrypted-vote
system is even more transparent than paper ballots that are hand-counted in the
presence of observers.  It is much closer in transparency to a roll-call vote, but it
retains ballot secrecy.  Proponents also believe that use of this approach could reduce
the costs of elections by reducing the need for physical security, testing, and other
activities.  They also state that the integrity of the system is not dependent on the
secrecy of the encryption keys, although privacy might be compromised if all keys
were broken or stolen or all trustees colluded. 
If successful, the approach could address many of the security issues with DREs
that this report discusses.  However, it does not yet appear to have been
independently evaluated and therefore could have currently unknown disadvantages
and vulnerabilities.  Also, it is not clear that it would have the same potential positive
impact on voter confidence as paper-based voter verification might.  That is because
a voter who does not understand the technology behind the system — and few voters
are likely to — may have no greater basis for confidence in the correspondence
between the encrypted receipt and the choices the voter made than is currently the
case with DREs.  Some proponents, however, believe that those concepts are simple
enough that they can be taught in secondary school.120  
If the system relies on printers at each voting booth, that raises issues similar to
those with respect to printers for voter-verifiable paper ballots.  Similarly, the
verifiability feature increases the complexity of the voting process for voters, with
unknown consequences.  In addition, it is not clear to what extent valid ballots could
be recovered in the event that tampering was found or malfunction occurred.  Finally,
some critics question whether encrypted receipts are in fact unable to show a voter’s
choices.  Proponents argue that these concerns are either unlikely to be a problem in
practice or are relatively easy to address.
CRS-32
121  As with many unsettled technologies, some problems have accompanied the evolution
of this technology. For example, the Caltech/MIT study found that jurisdiction using DREs
had a surprisingly large rate of residual votes (overvotes, undervotes, and spoiled ballots).
There have also been reports of some problems encountered in jurisdictions recently
acquiring the technology (see for example Kim Zetter, “Did E-Vote Firm Patch Election?”
Wired News, 13 October 2003, [http://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1283,60563,00.html]).
122  According to a recent report, “the incidence of election fraud in the United States is low
and…has had a minimal impact on electoral outcomes” (Lori Minnite and David Callahan,
“Securing the Vote: An Analysis of Election Fraud,” D‘mos, 2003, [http://www.demos-
usa.org/demos/pubs/Securing_The_Vote.pdf]).  However, there are documented cases of
problems with DREs and other computer-assisted voting technology that have resulted in
votes being lost, at least temporarily.  For a compilation of cases, with sources, see Harris,
Black Box Voting, p. 16–55.  It could not be determined to what extent such problems go
unreported, whether the options discussed in this report would reduce them, or if other kinds
of voting systems would exhibit fewer problems.  
Options That Might Be Considered 
The several methods proposed to address the verifiability issue — ranging from
printing paper ballots to new electronic ways of voting — each have different
strengths and weaknesses, making it difficult to determine at present whether any of
these approaches should be adopted.  At the same time, many observers would agree
that finding ways to increase the verifiability and transparency of electronic voting
is desirable.  DRE technology is clearly evolving fairly rapidly and has not yet
become settled, as witnessed by the diversity of available devices and features in
comparison to other kinds of voting systems.121  This environment may promote
developing improved security and other desirable properties of the technology.  At
the same time, as jurisdictions continue to adopt DREs in response to HAVA and
other factors, pressures to resolve security issues quickly may increase.  
While a defense-in-depth approach would appear to be generally desirable for
addressing security questions with DREs, as discussed above, any attempt to
implement such an approach needs to take into account potential problems that can
be associated with making substantial changes in the way an election is administered.
For example, when a voting system is replaced in a jurisdiction, the proportion of
residual votes and problems administering the election may actually increase initially,
at least in part because neither voters nor pollworkers are familiar with the new
system.  In addition, there are no proven cases of tampering with DREs or other
computer-assisted voting systems in public elections.122  For these and other reasons,
some observers argue that any changes to current technology and procedures should
be incremental.  Others, however, state that given the evolving threat environment
and the concerns that have been identified, an incremental approach is not sufficient
to prevent undetected tampering that could change the outcome of an election.
Policymakers will need to weigh such differences in determining what if any actions
to take in response to this set of issues.  
Three general approaches are discussed below for addressing the issues raised
in this report.  First, action could be left to state and local jurisdictions that administer
elections.  Second, the EAC could address the issues.  Third, Congress could take any
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of several possible actions.  These approaches and options, which are not mutually
exclusive, are discussed in turn below.
States.  Elections are administered by state and local governments, with the
federal government playing a circumscribed role.  Although that role was
substantially enhanced with the enactment of HAVA, the law stipulates that methods
of implementation of its requirements are to be left to the discretion of the states
(Sec. 305).  States may therefore address these issues individually, as, for example,
California, Maryland, and Ohio have already been doing.123  The availability of
federal funding under HAVA to improve election administration by state and local
governments, as well as the creation of an independent federal agency whose purpose
is to assist those governments in election administration, should improve the ability
of those governments to ensure the security of elections.  Leaving action to the states
would allow them to react to the issues in a timely fashion and in ways that are most
responsive to their individual circumstances and could lead to a variety of options
being tested by different states, making it easier to determine which approaches work
best.  However, this approach might also lead to a patchwork of responses, which
could be challenging for vendors to meet and could lead to some states being more
vulnerable to tampering than others.  
EAC.  The Election Assistance Commission created by HAVA will have some
responsibilities to provide guidance and to perform studies and research specifically
relating to the security of voting systems.  Its work in this area will involve NIST and
others with experience in computer security.  The EAC and its supporting boards and
committees may provide an effective venue for addressing fundamental questions
regarding voting system security and helping states meet their needs and
responsibilities in this regard as well as issues relating to voter confidence in the
security of DREs.  One option would be that the EAC could perform an independent
security review of current DREs.  This might be especially useful if it could be done
in cooperation with a selection of states exhibiting a range of security policies and
procedures.  However, to address the issue, the EAC must first form the relevant
boards and committees, and any study would require a significant amount of time to
complete.  The EAC may not, therefore, be able to resolve the controversy before
states need to make decisions about which kinds of voting systems to acquire.  
Congress.  Among the possible actions that Congress might consider are
hearings, funding to address the controversy, and revisions to HAVA.  Congress
could choose to hold hearings on the issue for several purposes, such as clarifying
issues and options, providing guidance to the EAC, or exploring funding and
legislative options.  It could also use other means, such as legislative report language
or direct communication from congressional leaders, to encourage the EAC to
address the controversy in an expedited manner.  
Given the range of proposals for addressing DRE security issues, and the
uncertainties associated with those proposals, Congress might also consider
supporting research and development (R&D) in this area to identify the most
appropriate solutions.  In the past, economic incentives for private investment in such
CRS-34
124  These are provided for information purposes only.  CRS does not take positions on or
advocate legislative and policy proposals.
125  Relevant laws include the Computer Security Act (P.L. 100-235), the Paperwork
Reduction Act (P.L. 104-13), the Clinger-Cohen Act (P.L. 104-106), and the Federal
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126  H.R. 2239 (Holt), the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003,
includes this requirement, with a separate paperless system available for voters with
disabilities.  It would also requires “manual mandatory surprise recounts” in 0.5% of
election jurisdictions, require the use of open-source software in voting machines, prohibit
the use of wireless communications by voting systems, and require that all voting system
hardware and software be certified by accredited laboratories.  
R&D have been weak, given the small, fragmented nature of the market for voting
systems and the relatively low demand for sophisticated security for those systems.
With the funding for new voting systems that HAVA provides, the evolving threat
environment, and other factors, that situation may be changing.  HAVA also
authorized grants for R&D to improve security and other aspects of voting
technology (Sec. 271), but Congress has not appropriated funds specifically for that
program.  Presumably, the EAC could use some of its general operating funds for
such work, or Congress could appropriate funds specifically for it.
Several options for revising HAVA might be considered for a legislative
response to the controversy:124
! A specific security provision could be added to the voting system
requirements, stipulating, for example, that voting systems must
adhere to security requirements for federal computer systems as
required under current law,125 or requirements or a mechanism to
develop them that is specified in the provision.  
! The voting system audit requirement in the Act could be revised to
require a voter-verifiable paper ballot126 or some other system of
voter verifiability.
! Voting systems could be required to use open-source software.
! The Act could specify a security review and certification process for
all voting systems.  
! The Act could specify that experts in security be represented on the
Technical Guidelines Development Committee.  
! The EAC could be directed to provide security consultation services
to state and local jurisdictions. 
! The deadlines for meeting relevant requirements, such as for
accessibility of voting systems, could be delayed pending resolution
of the controversy.
! Federal funding could be provided for upgrades or replacements for
DREs purchased under HAVA if they are shown subsequently to
have significant security defects.
Some of the above options would themselves be controversial, as discussed
earlier in this report with respect to voter verifiability and use of open source
software.  In addition, creating additional requirements would further increase the
CRS-35
federal role in election administration, which may be opposed by those who believe
that it should be left to the states as much as possible.  Options that would strengthen
the ability of the EAC to help address this controversy may themselves be less
controversial but might not lead to a timely resolution of the issues.  Delays in
meeting HAVA requirements are also likely to be controversial, and, some would
argue, may not be necessary if the controversy can be resolved before 2006.  Finally,
additional funding authorization and appropriations may be difficult to enact in a
constrained budget environment.
Conclusions
The purpose of this report has been to explain the controversy about the security
of DREs and to lay out the issues raised and options for addressing them. The report
does not attempt to resolve the controversy.  However, some conclusions can be
drawn with respect to the questions asked at the beginning of the report.
! Do DREs exhibit genuine security vulnerabilities?  If so, could those
vulnerabilities be exploited to influence an election?
Given the worsening threat environment for information technology and the
findings of several studies and analyses discussed in this report, at least some current
DREs clearly exhibit security vulnerabilities.  Those vulnerabilities pose potential but
not demonstrated risks to the integrity of elections, in that no proven cases exist
involving tampering with DREs.  Observers differ in their views about whether these
potential risks are significant enough that they need to be addressed urgently or
whether they can be addressed incrementally.
! To what extent do current election administration procedures and
other security measures protect against threats to and vulnerabilities
of DRE systems?
The answer to this question is a central point of contention in the controversy,
with vendors and election administrators generally claiming that current measures are
sufficient and certain other experts, most notably many computer scientists, and some
activists claiming that they are not.  These differences of opinion appear to be based
in part on differences in philosophical perspective.  Proponents of approaches such
as voter verifiability believe that elections should rely for security on openness,
transparency, and observability of the entire election process, and that currently too
much trust is placed in the behavior and capabilities of vendors, election officials,
and other involved parties.  Many election administrators and vendors, and some
other observers, believe that the views of such proponents are based on
misunderstandings of how voting systems work and how elections are administered.
They also believe that approaches such as a voter-verifiable paper ballot would not
be of net benefit to the proper functioning of elections.  Resolution of such
fundamental differences may require — if it is in fact achievable — that those on
both sides of this controversy develop better understanding of the bases for the views
of the other side.  Finding an effective solution may be easier if concerned computer
scientists understand in detail how elections are run (perhaps by working directly
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with administrators) and if election administrators understand cybersecurity more
clearly (perhaps by working with computer scientists). 
In any case, as indicated by some of the studies discussed in this report,
significant improvements in the security of DREs may be found through careful
analysis of current systems and how they are implemented and administered, without
requiring voter verifiability or other substantial changes.  However, such
improvements in current systems are not likely to address the fundamental concerns
raised by proponents of voter verifiability. 
! Do those threats and vulnerabilities apply to computer-assisted
voting systems other than DREs?
The potential threats and vulnerabilities associated with DREs are substantially
greater than those associated with punchcard or optical scan readers, both because
DREs are more complex and because they have no independent records of the votes
cast.  However, document-ballot readers are potentially subject to malware that could
affect the count, to vulnerabilities associated with connection to other computers, and
some other kinds of tampering.  Therefore, the security of systems using readers
might also benefit from some of the same kinds of approaches that have been
proposed for DREs, such as improvements to current security policies and
procedures, use of modern software engineering techniques, and use of strong
cryptographic protocols.  
! What are the options for addressing any threats and vulnerabilities
that do exist, and what are the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the different options?
The report discusses seven proposals for addressing the security issues raised
about DREs.  They include using current procedures and security mechanisms, with
improvements as necessary; improving standards for the development and
certification of voting systems; using open-source software for voting systems; and
several methods to improve the transparency and verifiability of elections, including
voter-verified paper ballots and an electronic version of that approach, use of
modular electronic voting architecture that physically separates the voter interface
from the casting and counting functions; and a system that uses cryptographic
protocols to permit voters to verify that their ballots were cast as intended and that
no votes were improperly changed, omitted, or added.  These proposals vary in ease
of implementation, the degree to which they have been tested in application, and the
level of contention about both their ability to resolve the controversy and their overall
desirability.  
Most of the public debate has centered around whether to rely on current
procedures and mechanisms or adopt voter-verifiable paper ballots.  However, these
are clearly not the only options, and the debate might benefit from fuller
consideration of other possibilities such as those discussed above.  In addition,
several of the proposals discussed are not mutually exclusive, and a resolution of the
controversy may involve elements of several proposals.
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Three policy approaches, which are also not mutually exclusive, were discussed.
The matter could be left to state and local governments, which administer elections;
some states have already taken action.  The newly formed EAC could address the
issues through its convening power and responsibilities in the development of
voluntary guidelines for and certification of voting systems.  Congress could decide
to use hearings or other mechanisms to provide guidance on the issues, or it might
decide that a legislative solution is necessary.  Several legislative options exist,
ranging from funding for research on the issue to adding requirements on DRE
security to HAVA.  The benefits and disadvantages of these approaches depend on
many factors, and a legislative solution may become more attractive if the
controversy cannot be resolved through other means.
